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In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in 
promoting cooperative behavior. We focus on intergroup competition that 
is non-rival in the sense that everyone can be a winner. This type of 
competition does not give groups an incentive to outcompete others. 
However, in spite of this fact, we find that intergroup competition produces 
a universal increase in cooperation. Furthermore, in settings where there are 
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1. Introduction 
Teamwork is often beset with the notorious free-rider problem, and promoting 
cooperation within teams is therefore a key governance issue in a broad range of 
organizations. Because of its importance, a considerable literature in experimental 
economics has investigated the effectives of alternative institutions in promoting 
cooperation within one team.1  
This paper is concerned with promoting cooperation within teams by 
introducing competition between a set of intrinsically independent teams. A well-
known example is the use, by J. Robert Oppenheimer, of competing teams to 
motivate scientists in Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project (Gosling, 1999). 
Large automobile companies sometimes let several teams compete when 
developing the design of a new car. Our mechanism is based on penalizing under-
performing teams rather than rewarding the best-performing team. While the 
incentive mechanism we propose is rather unpleasant for team members as only 
negative incentives (punishments) are used, it is more pleasant than other 
competition schemes in other respects. In particular, our mechanism reduces the 
potentially demoralizing effect of competition because teams can avoid sanctions 
altogether by exerting high effort and allows for avoiding the negative externality a 
winning team exerts on other teams.   
Given that the high degree of control of laboratory experiments makes them 
an excellent tool for the study of intergroup competition,2 various researchers have 
used them to demonstrate, for example, that intergroup competition can promote 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Bornstein et al., 1990; Bornstein and Erev, 1994; 
Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; van Dijk et al. 2001), and can facilitate coordination 
on Pareto-dominant equilibria in coordination games (Bornstein et al., 2002; 
                                                     
1 Examples include communication (e.g. Isaac et al. 1984), peer pressure (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000), 
tax and subsidy mechanisms (Falkinger et al. 2000), and leadership (Levati et al. 2007). 
2 For instance, experiments allow us to isolate the various channels though which group competition 
affects cooperative behavior. A good example is Tan and Bolle (2007) who disentangle the effect of 
monetary incentives versus the effect of simply observing the performance of another group. 
2 
Riechmann and Weimann, 2008). However, to the best of our knowledge, 
experimental work on intergroup competition has focused on competition schemes 
in which the winning prize is rival. In other words, there can be only one wining 
group, which implies that contributing towards your group necessarily harms the 
groups you are competing with. 
Although a large number of situations are well-described by rival intergroup 
competition (e.g., firms fighting for market share), there are many cases in which 
groups compete that do not possess an ‚I win, you lose‛ characteristic. For example, 
teams within a firm might be penalized if they fall behind the performance of 
others, but if all teams perform equally well no punishment is meted out—that is, 
everyone wins. In this paper, we study the effectiveness of this type of non-rival 
intergroup competition for promoting cooperation in social dilemmas.  
We run a laboratory experiment in which five groups compete with each 
other. Groups with the highest group output win the contest and those with lower 
output are penalized. In particular, groups are ranked according to their output and 
groups who are not ranked 1st have their earnings reduced—with the reduction 
(weakly) increasing with their distance to 1st place. A group’s ranking is given by: 1 
+ number of groups with strictly better performance.3 Hence, we allow more than 
one winner. In the case in which all groups produce the same amount, everyone 
wins and no group is punished. As is typical for group production, our experiment 
is characterized by having a social dilemma structure (we use a linear public good 
game, see Isaac et al., 1984), which gives individuals an incentive to free-ride on the 
effort of other group members.4 We think this design captures, in a simple manner, 
the main characteristics of non-rival intergroup competition. 
Non-rival intergroup competition has an important disadvantage as a 
mechanism for the promotion of within-group cooperation. Namely, groups do not 
have an incentive to outperform others (although they do have an incentive to avoid 
falling behind). In other words, it does not eliminate equilibria with low levels of 
                                                     
3 This type of ranking is used in, for example, in Olympic sports in which ties are not broken. 
4 In the absence of competition, the dominant strategy is to not contribute to group output. 
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cooperation, which makes it theoretically unclear whether it can reduce free riding. 
It is therefore interesting to observe under what conditions competing groups can 
coordinate on high-output equilibria. To explore this question, we run three 
treatments with different penalty schemes. 
Non-rival intergroup competition does have the advantage that it reduces the 
negative externality of own-group production on the earnings of other groups. This 
can be important as the possibility of hurting others and have others hurt you can 
crowd out motivations such as positive reciprocity and altruism (Gächter and Fehr, 
2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003).5 As shown by Großer and Sausgruber (2005), this 
crowding out is present in rival intergroup competition. In their paper, they show 
that competition discourages pro-social individuals from cooperating. With non-
rival competition, if groups are in a situation in which nobody is losing, prosocial 
individuals have no reason to stop cooperating. Our mechanism relies on penalizing 
under-performing groups, but sanctions can be avoided altogether by providing 
high performance. Loss-averse team members may therefore be particularly 
motivated to cooperate in our mechanism. 
The literature on intergroup competition has mainly found that rival 
competition promotes cooperation (for an excellent summary see Bornstein, 2003). 
However, recent studies have also found that with repetition the gains from 
competition can be small (Tan and Bolle, 2007) or non-existent (Großer and 
Sausgruber, 2005). From these studies one can see that, by and large, competition is 
beneficial when it supports full cooperation as a Nash equilibrium (as was the case 
in the first papers). To explore the effect of a full-cooperation equilibrium in the case 
of non-rival competition, we run two treatments in which full cooperation is 
supported in equilibrium and a treatment where it is not. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the experimental 
design. In section 3 we present the results and in section 4 we conclude. 
 
                                                     
5 For an extensive review of monetary incentives and the crowding out of pro-social behavior see Frey 
and Jegen (2001). 
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2. The experiment 
The experiment consists of two parts, each lasting 10 periods. In part 1, participants 
play a standard linear public goods game in groups of n subjects (Isaac et al., 1984). 
In each period, subjects receive an endowment y = 20 and decide how much of it 
they want to keep and how much they want to contribute to their group’s output. 
Period earnings are determined by πi = y – ci + α∑j cj, where ci is subject i’s 
contribution to group output and α is the marginal per-capita return of group 
production. In all treatments, α < 1 and nα > 1, ensuring both an individual incentive 
to free ride and an efficiency gain from cooperation. In part 1, under the assumption 
that all players are own-payoff maximizers, the unique subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium is for all subjects to keep all their endowment. 
In part 2, competition between K groups is introduced. In each period, groups 
are ranked according to total contributions. A group k’s rank rk is given by one plus 
the number of groups that have contributions that are strictly higher than k’s. In 
other words, groups that contribute the same amount share the same rank. In part 2, 
a subject’s earnings also depend on their group’s rank. In particular, members of 
groups that are not ranked 1st have their earnings reduced. Specifically, the earnings 
of subject i who is member of group k equal πik = πi × f(rk), where πi is the same as in 
part 1 and f(rk) is a function that transforms group k’s rank into a number less than 
or equal to one.6 In the experiment, we set f(rk) = 1 if rk = 1, f(rk) < 1 if rk > 1, and f(rk) ≤ 
f(rm) if rk > rm. 
With intergroup competition, although full defection is still an equilibrium, 
there are many equilibria at positive contribution levels. We concentrate on the 
Pareto-dominant equilibrium—that is, the equilibrium with the highest average 
payoff (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). In this equilibrium, all competing groups exhibit 
the same total contributions. However, in some cases, individuals within groups can 
                                                     
6 This kind of intergroup competition scheme is used in the production of broiler chicken (Knoeber and 
Thurman 1994). The principal (a large firm called integrator) subcontracts with smaller firms 
(‚growers‛) to raise the chicks. The growers are provided with baby chicks and feed by the integrator. 
The growers deliver the mature chicken to the integrator and are paid according to their relative 
productivity. That is, growers who used less feed per pound of chicken get a higher price per pound. 
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be contributing different amounts. In other words, to attain this equilibrium, 
individuals must overcome two coordination problems: one between groups and 
the other within groups. A priori, it is unclear whether subjects will successfully 
resolve these coordination problems. However, if this is sometimes the case, it is 
interesting to know under which conditions they manage to do so and whether their 
success varies with differences in the incentives to compete. 
We ran three treatments, each using a different f(rk). The specific parameters 
used in each treatment are shown in Table 1. Treatment 1 (T1) implements a strong 
competition scheme where groups have an incentive to outperform each other if 
doing so improves their current rank. T1’s competition scheme has the desirable 
property that there is only one Pareto-dominant equilibrium, which consists of full 
cooperation by all subjects in all groups. To see why, suppose all individuals fully 
contribute to the public good in T1. The sum of contributions is then 4 × 20, and each 
individual earns 32 (i.e.,  (20 – 20 + 0.4 × (4 × 20)) × 1). Suppose individual i considers 
unilaterally switching from full to zero contributions. The earnings of individual i 
fall from 32 to 8.8 (i.e. (20 + 0.4 × (3 × 20 + 0)) × 0.2). The drastic reduction in i’s 
earnings is the result of a drop, from first to last, in the rank of i’s group. Thus, no 
player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from full contribution given that 
everyone else also fully contributes. Unilateral deviation also imposes a large 
externality on other group members (their earnings fall from 32 each to 4.8). This 
equilibrium ought to be attractive to all subjects as it maximizes efficiency and 
produces no within-group inequality. The downside of T1 is the harsh punishment 
a group suffers if it does not achieve a high rank. In other words, in T1, 
miscoordination is very costly and might cause an overall reduction in earnings. 











f(rk) for different values of rk 
1 2 3 4 5 
T1 0.40 4 5 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 
T2 0.50 3 5 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 




Treatment 2 (T2) somewhat weakens the competition scheme by eliminating a 
group’s incentive to improve if this only leads to a change within ranks 2 to 5. This 
could lead to lower cooperation levels if, for example, a group is clearly 
outcompeting the rest. In T2, full cooperation is also the only Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium. Moreover, failing to achieve a high rank is again quite costly. 
Treatment 3 (T3) keeps the motivation to improve at all ranks as in T1, but 
lowers considerably the size of the incentive. This treatment is interesting because 
full cooperation is no longer an equilibrium. In effect, the highest contribution level 
supported in equilibrium occurs when contributions in all groups equal 40 out of 60 
(67% of their resources). This fact makes coordination between and within groups 
harder to achieve. In particular, there are now numerous Pareto-dominant 
equilibria, and the majority of them imply within-group differences in cooperation. 
For example, a group can attain contributions of 40 by having either all its group 
members contribute 13.3 (which produces no in-group inequality) or by having two 
group members contribute 20 and one member contribute 0 (which gives the non-
contributing member a much higher payoff). Hence, unlike in T1 and T2, the 
multiplicity of Pareto-dominant equilibria might hinder a group’s ability to 
coordinate on the desired contribution level as each individual might vie for the 
equilibrium that favors them. The upside of T3 is that the payoff loss of failing to get 
a high rank is smaller and hence miscoordination is less costly. 
We conducted three sessions per treatment. Each session consisted of five 
groups that played individually in part 1 and then competed with each other in part 
2. Treatment 1 was conducted in the University of St. Gallen with MBA students as 
subjects. Treatments 2 and 3 were conducted in the University of Copenhagen with 
undergraduate students of various fields. The experiment was programmed and 
run with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and we used the usual experimental procedures 
of anonymity, incentivized payments, and neutrally worded instructions. Overall, 
150 subjects participated in our experiment, and they earned US$23.75 on average. 




We present the experimental results in the following order. First, we analyze the 
effect of intergroup competition on mean contributions in all treatments. Second, we 
focus on the behavior of individual groups. Third, we report how the different 
competition schemes affect overall earnings. 
 
3.1 Overall cooperation 
Figure 1 shows the mean contributions to the public good in the three treatments. In 
periods 1 to 10 subjects play without intergroup competition whereas groups 
compete in periods 11 to 20. As is common in public goods games without 
competition (Ledyard, 1995), we observe a significant decline in contributions over 
time (Spearman’s ρ < -0.39 p < 0.001). We also see in part 1 that mean contributions 
in T1 at 6.3 are somewhat lower than those in T2 and T3, which are 8.8 and 10.0 
respectively. However, if we do pair-wise comparisons with Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests (WMW), we cannot reject the hypotheses that contributions in all 
treatments come from the same distribution (p > 0.100).7 
As soon as competition is introduced, we see a sharp increase in contributions. 
Averaging over all ten periods of part 2, contributions increase to 18.4 in T1, 17.4 in 
T2, and 13.7 in T3, which corresponds to a striking increase of 191% in T1, 97% in 
T2, and 37% in T3. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (WSR) confirm that the change in 
contributions is statistically significant in all treatments (p < 0.003). In addition, in T1 
and T2, contributions no longer display a significantly decreasing trend.8  
                                                     
7 Throughout this section, we apply two-sided test statistics and use group averages across all periods 
of a part as independent observations. Moreover, when we test the same hypothesis in multiple 
treatments or when we do pair-wise comparisons, we adjust p-values with the method of Benjamini 
and Hochberg (1995) to minimize the chance of false positives due to multiple testing. 
8 Spearman’s ρ = 0.39 (p < 0.001) in T1, ρ = 0.07 (p = 0.385) in T2, and ρ = -0.30 (p < 0.001) in T3. 
8 
If we compare contributions across treatments in part 2, we find them to be 
significantly lower in T3 relative to T1 and T2 (WMW tests, p < 0.030). This 
difference is consistent with the theoretical predictions in the sense that in T3, full 
contribution by all subjects in all groups is not supported in equilibrium. In fact, it is 
interesting to see that, on average, contributions in all treatments are fairly close to 
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (20.0 in T1 and T2, and 13.3 in T3). 
Next, we look at whether intergroup competition increases the contributions 
of all groups or just of some. We find that, in T1 and T2, competition produces an 
increase in average contributions in all 15 groups. In T3, average contributions 
increase in 12 out of 15 groups, they remain constant in 1 group, and decrease in 2 
groups.  
In summary, in spite of the fact that groups do not have an incentive to 
























FIGURE 1 – MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS 
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3.2. Relative performance and cooperation 
The increase in cooperation can also be seen if we look at groups by rank. That is, 
we look at the average difference in contributions between groups that are ranked 
kth when there is competition and when there is no competition. This difference can 
be seen in Figure 2, which shows average contributions by rank for each treatment 
(see red lines). Periods with no competition are displayed in the top part of the 
figure and periods with competition are displayed in the bottom part.  
Without competition, average contributions in T1, T2, and T3 range from 2.0, 
2.8, and 3.7 for groups ranked 5th to 12.6, 15.0, and 17.0 for groups ranked 1st (see 
right scale in Figure 2). Once competition is introduced, we see an increase in 
contributions at all ranks: average contributions now range from 13.3, 9.3, and 7.3 
for groups ranked 5th to 20.0, 20.0, and 19.8 for groups ranked 1st.9 Hence, we can 
conclude that non-rival intergroup competition produces a universal improvement 
in cooperation. 
Nevertheless, since an increase in contributions does not necessarily translate 
into higher earnings, it is yet unclear whether most groups would find it desirable 
to compete. In order to guarantee themselves a higher payoff, groups also have to 
be ranked 1st. Ideally, all groups are ranked 1st and nobody suffers a payoff loss. In 
other words, we must also take a look at the distribution of rankings. 
Figure 2 also contains bar diagrams. The height of the bar shows the average 
number of groups (across periods) that attained a given rank. For example, the 
rightmost bar in the bottom left diagram shows that about 3 (out of 5) groups were 
ranked first in a typical period of treatment T1 with competition. We can see that, 
without intergroup competition, there is usually one group per rank in all 
treatments. In other words, cooperation levels are dispersed such that, in an average 
period, one group has the highest cooperation level, another group the second 
highest, yet another one the third highest, and so on. 
                                                     
9 With one exception, the change in cooperation between no competition and competition is 
statistically significant for all ranks in all treatments (WMW tests, p < 0.022 for all comparisons except 
for of groups ranked 2nd in T3 where p = 0.389). 
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With intergroup competition, the distribution of rankings changes 
considerably. In particular, there is an increase in the number of groups that are 
ranked 1st. In an average period with competition, 3.1 groups are ranked 1st in T1, 3.2 
in T2, and 1.7 in T3 (up from 1.0, 1.1, and 1.3 respectively). The change in the 
number of groups that are ranked 1st is statistically significant in T1 and T2 but not 
in T3 (WSR tests, p < 0.007 in T1 and T2, and p = 0.288 in T3). The number of groups 
ranked 1st is even bigger and the differences between T3 and the other treatments 
are more pronounced if we consider only periods close to the end. For example, if 
we look at the last five periods with competition, the number of groups ranked 1st is 
3.9 in T1, 3.5 in T2, and 1.5 in T3.  
This is a remarkable result for T1 and T2 as not only are a substantial number 
of groups attaining the top rank, they attain it at the maximum cooperation level 
(i.e., at 20.0). This virtually perfect cooperation is consistent with groups trying to 
coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. In T3, competition stimulates 
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FIGURE 2 – GROUP RANKINGS 
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cooperation level. In fact, given that the highest level of contributions supported in 
equilibrium is 13.3 and that groups ranked 1st are clearly contributing more than this 
amount, it appears that (some) groups are not even attempting to coordinate on one 
of the Nash equilibria. 
 
3.3 Group and individual cooperation 
Next, we check whether cooperation in periods without competition predicts 
cooperation in periods with competition. This is important as it allows us to observe 
whether intergroup competition is robust to preferences for cooperation. In other 
words, we check whether the increase in contributions is due to groups or 
individuals who are intrinsically motivated to cooperate or whether those with 
more selfish preferences also react with higher cooperation. We start the analysis at 
the group level.  
A simple way of observing whether relatively cooperative groups remain 
cooperative once intergroup competition is introduced is to look at the correlation 
between the groups’ average ranking with and without competition. In T1, 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient between these two variables is ρ = 0.25 (p = 0.547). 
In T2 it is ρ = 0.15 (p = 0.595), and in T3 it is ρ = 0.74 (p = 0.005). Hence, in both T1 and 
T2, cooperativeness without competition is not a good predictor or cooperativeness 
with competition, unsurprisingly perhaps, as competition increases contributions in 
all groups to very high levels. The opposite is true for T3. In this treatment, a 
group’s ranking with no competition is an excellent predictor of the group’s ranking 
once competition is introduced. In other words, competition increases contributions 
in all groups but does not alter the groups’ relative position. 
If we look at contributions by individuals, we find a similar result. We 
calculate for each individual in each treatment, group, and period their ranking 
within the group. Rankings are calculated using the same procedure as for groups. 
At this point we can look at the correlation between the individuals’ average 
ranking with and without competition. In T1 and T2, Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients are low and are not significantly different from zero (for T1 ρ = -0.09, p = 
12 
0.509, and for T2 ρ = 0.15, p = 0.477). In other words, both cooperative and 
uncooperative individuals start cooperating substantially with competition in T1 
and T2. This finding is exciting because it shows that the success of intergroup 
competition does not rely on the presence of highly motivated cooperators that 
reliably generate high levels of cooperation. However, the results from T3 remind us 
that this desirable robustness depends on the proper implementation of incentives 
for competition (in T3 high levels of cooperation are not sustained by an 
equilibrium). In T3, in spite of the increase in contributions, relatively cooperative 
individuals (within their group) keep on being the most cooperative during periods 
with intergroup competition (ρ = 0.53, p = 0.001).10  
 
3.4. Competition and welfare 
The previous discussion has shown that intergroup competition increases overall 
contributions, in all treatments, and the effect is particularly strong in T1 and T2. 
Contributions to the public good are directly proportional to a measure of efficiency, 
namely, the output produced by all groups. This measure is relevant if we consider 
how competition improves overall output in a firm, say. However, a more 
conservative measure of efficiency is to consider the sum effective earnings of 
participants and treating the sanctions as ‚waste‛. This measure is relevant if we ask 
how much popular support the introduction of competition may enjoy. 
We find that intergroup competition has an ambiguous effect on earnings. 
Averaging over all periods, earnings per subject in periods without competition are 
23.8 in T1, 24.4 in T2, and 25.0 in T3, and in periods with competition, they are 24.5 
in T1, 24.0 in T2, and 24.7 in T3. Hence, we see a slight increase in earnings in T1 and 
a slight decrease in T2 and T3. However, these differences are not statistically 
significant in any of the treatments (WSR tests, p > 0.100). We do see some 
differences when we look at how earnings change with repetition. Without 
competition, earnings display a significantly decreasing trend (Spearman’s 
                                                     
10 Note that we do not find that competition crowds out contributions by ‘pro-social’ individuals—that 
is, individuals who are high contributors in the absence of competition. 
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correlation coefficients are the same as for contributions). In contrast, in T1 we find 
that earnings significantly increase with time (Spearman’s ρ = 0.34, p = 0.001) and in 
T2 they do not show a significant decrease (Spearman’s ρ = 0.07, p = 0.385). In T3, it 
is still the case that earnings exhibit a significantly decreasing trend (Spearman’s ρ = 
-0.21, p = 0.017). 
Figure 3 shows average earnings for periods with competition as a percentage 
of earnings in the equivalent period without competition. As can be seen, in both T1 
and T2, earnings with competition are initially well below earnings without 
competition. However, after three periods, the opposite is true. In T1, the effect is 
particularly strong. Thus, if the time trends continue, one could argue that, given 
enough repetition, competition will eventually produce a positive effect on 
earnings.  
Instead of looking at average earnings, another way of evaluating the welfare 
effect of intergroup competition is to look at the number of individuals who benefit 
from it. In T1, averaging across all periods, 42 out of 60 subjects (70%) earned more 











































FIGURE 3 – RELATIVE EARNINGS 
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(56%) earned more and 20 (44%) earned less, and in T3, 22 out of 45 (49%) earned 
more, 22 (49%) earned less, and 1 (2%) earned the same amount. Hence, in T1 and 
T2, a majority of subjects benefit from competing whereas in T3 this is equally split. 
If we test whether a significantly more subjects benefit from competition than suffer 
from it, we find that this is the case in T1 but not in T2 and T3 (Sign tests, p = 0.008 
for T1, p = 0.827 for T2, and p = 1.000 for T3). 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting 
cooperative behavior. In particular, we focus on intergroup competition that is non-
rival in the sense that everyone can be a winner. We report the results of a 
laboratory experiment where we vary the incentives to compete. We find that 
intergroup competition produces a universal increase in cooperation. Hence, we 
find it to be an effective way of increasing overall group output. Furthermore, in 
settings where there are strong incentives to compete, intergroup competition 
benefits a majority of individuals, albeit, it does not produce an increase in 
everyone’s earnings. 
The type of intergroup competition considered in this paper does not give 
groups a strict incentive to outcompete others. However, in spite of this fact, 
intergroup competition increased contributions in 93.33% of the groups. This is even 
the case in the treatment with relatively weak incentives to compete, in which 80% 
of the groups increased their average contribution. Thus, for the purpose of 
increasing group output, non-rival intergroup competition works remarkably well. 
In treatments with strong incentives to compete, intergroup competition 
generally produced the desired result, that is, many winners and few (or no) losers. 
Thus, in spite of the multiplicity of equilibria, subjects seem to focus on the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium. With reduced incentives to compete, groups fail to 
coordinate on the same cooperation level. Interestingly, this miscoordination seems 
to be due to the fact the highest-paying equilibrium is no longer the Pareto-
dominant outcome. This gives ‘naturally’ cooperative groups an incentive to deviate 
15 
from it, as by doing so they can obtain higher earnings. The downside is that groups 
which are less cooperative are not able to match those contribution levels and thus 
may be discouraged by constantly losing the competition. 
The effect of intergroup competition on the earnings of individuals is less 
straightforward. In the two treatments with strong incentives to compete a majority 
of participants receive higher earnings with competition. However, in spite of the 
fact that most groups manage to be winners, the few losing groups combined with 
the large penalty for not winning results in comparable average earnings with or 
without competition. This fact is apparent when comparing the earnings of the best- 
and worst-performing groups. In the two treatments with strong incentives, the 
average earnings of the worst-performing group (out of five) decrease from 21.8 
without competition to 14.2 with competition. In contrast, the earnings of the best-
performing group increase from 27.0 to 30.4. In other words, intergroup competition 
increases the earnings of a majority but strongly reduces those of a minority. When 
groups compete in the treatment with weaker incentives, the penalty for losing is 
smaller but so are the gains from cooperation, which results again in statistically 
indistinguishable earnings from the case where there is no competition.11 
In summary, we find that that strong non-rival intergroup competition 
produces a robust increase in cooperative behavior and can benefit a majority of 
individuals. However, it also produces a few individuals that are severely 
disadvantaged. 
 
                                                     
11 In this treatment, the difference between worst- and best-performing groups is affected less by 
competition. With competition, the average earnings of the worst-performing group decrease from 22.5 
to 20.3, and those of the best-performing group increase from 27.6 to 28.9. 
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Appendix – Instructions  
Below we reproduce the instructions used in T3. Instructions for other treatments 
are available upon request. 
General Instructions 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Depending on your decisions 
and the decisions of other participants you can earn a considerable amount of 
money. How you can earn money is described in these instructions. It is therefore 
important that you read these instructions carefully. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other 
participants in whatever way. If you have any questions please raise your hand. 
One of us will come to your table to answer your question. 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end 
of the experiment points will be converted to Danish kroner (DKK) at the following 
rate: 
25 points = 10 DKK 
After the experiment your total earnings from the experiment will be paid out to 
you anonymously and in cash. 
In the experiment, all participants are randomly divided into groups of 3. This 
means that you are in a group with two other participants. You will be part of the 
same group throughout the experiment. Nobody knows which other participants 
are in their group, and nobody will be informed who was in which group after the 
experiment. 
The experiment today consists of two parts. You will receive detailed 
instructions of each part of the experiment before the start of the respective part. 
The following pages describe in detail part one of the experiment. 
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Instructions for part one 
Your decision 
The first part of the experiment has 10 periods. In each period, everyone will be 
given an endowment of 20 points. Then, you and the other group members 
simultaneously decide how to use the endowment of 20 points. You have two 
possibilities: 
1. You can allocate points to a group account. 
2. You can allocate points to a private account. 
You have to use your entire endowment in each period. That is, the points you 
put into the group account and the points you put into the private account have to 
sum up to 20. You will be asked to indicate the number of points you want to put in 
the group account. The remaining points will be automatically allocated to the 
private account. 
How to calculate your income 
Your total income depends on the total number of points in the group account, and 
the number of points in your private account.  
Your income from your private account is equal to the number of points you 
allocated to the private account. For each point you put into the private account you 
get an income of 1 point. The income of other group members is not affected by the 
points you allocate to your private account. For example, your income from the 
private account is 3 points if you put 3 points into it. 
Your income from the group account is the sum of points allocated to the 
group account by all 3 members multiplied by 0.5. For each point you put into the 
group account you and all other group members get an income of 0.5 points. For 
example, if the sum of points in the group account is 24, then your income from the 
group account and the income of each other group member from the group account 
is 12. 
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Your income in points 
20 – (points you allocate to the group account) + 0.5 × (the sum of points allocated by 
all 3 group members to the account) 
You get an income of 1 point for each point you allocate to your private 
account. If you instead allocate 1 extra point to the group account, your income from 
the group account increases by 1 × 0.5 = 0.5 points and your income from your 
private account decreases by 1 point. Note that by doing this the income of other 
group members increases by 0.5 points. Therefore, the total group income increases 
by 3 × 0.5 = 1.5 points. Other group members therefore also obtain income if you 
allocate points to the group account. Note that, you also obtain income from points 
allocated to the group account by other members. You obtain 1 × 0.5 = 0.5 points for 
each point allocated to the group account by another group member. 
Examples 
Suppose you allocate 10 points to the group account, the second member of your 
group allocates 20 points and the third group member allocates 0 points. In this 
case, the sum of points on the group account will be 30 points, and all group 
members get an income of 30 × 0.5 = 15 points from the group account.  
Your income in that period is: (20 – 10) + 15 = 25 points. 
The second group member’s income is: (20 – 20) + 15 = 15 points. 
The third group member’s income is: (20 – 0) + 15 = 35 points. 
 
Instructions for part two 
In this part of the experiment, everything is the same as in part one, except that your 
income will be influenced by the ‚rank‛ that your group has relative to the other 
groups. 
The ranking is based on the number of points on the group account of your group 
compared to the other groups. This will be explained in more detail later. 
In the experiment there are 5 groups in total. Group composition will be the 
same as in part one. That is, the two other members of your group will be the same 
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as before. Except for the ranking everything is the same. In particular each 
participant decides how to allocate 20 points in each period as before.  
How to calculate your income 
Here is an illustration of, how your decision determines your income, note that it is 
the points allocated to the group account by all members that determine the rank of the 
group. 
Your decision  Points in the group account  Rank  Conversion  Income 
Your decision, that is, the number of points you allocate to the group account, 
influences the total number of points on the group account. The total number of 
points on the group account determines the rank of your group. The rank 
determines the conversion factor. The conversion factor influences all your period’s 
income. 
Your income in points 
[ 20 – (points you allocate to the group account) + 0.5 × (the sum of points allocated 
by all 3 group members to the account) ] × conversion factor 
The size of the conversion factor, is determined by the points allocated to your 
group account compared the group account of other groups. Note that all of your 
income is multiplied by the conversion factor.  
For a given contribution, the higher the conversion factor of your group, the 
higher your income. The group with the highest number of points on the group 
account is assigned rank 1, which means that this group gets the highest conversion 
factor of 1.0. The group with the second highest number of points on the group 
account is assigned rank 2, which means that this group gets a conversion factor of 
0.95, and so on. The conversion factor for a given rank is given in the following 
table. 







If more than one group contributes the same number of points to the group 
account, then they get the same conversion factor. For example if all groups have 
the same number of points in the group account, they all have the same rank (that is, 
rank 1) and the same conversion factor (that is, 1.00).  
If two groups are ranked 1, the group with the third highest number of points 




Number of points in the 
group account 
Rank Conversion Factor 
1 29 3 0.90 
2 32 1 1.00 
3 32 1 1.00 
4 29 3 0.90 
5 11 5 0.80 
 
Suppose you are a member of group 1 and suppose you have allocated 10 
points to the group account, suppose the other two members allocated 19 points in 
total. In this case the sum of points on the group account is 29, and the rank of your 
group is 3. The conversion factor of your group is 0.90. As a consequence your 
income is: (20 – 10 + 0.5 × 29) × 0.90 = 22.05 points. 
Now, suppose you are a member of group 2 and suppose you have allocated 0 
points to the group account, suppose the other two members allocated 32 points in 
total. In this case the sum of points on the group account is 32, and the rank of your 
group is 1. The conversion factor of your group is 1.00. As a consequence your 
income is: (20 – 0 + 0.5 × 32) × 1.00 = 36 points. 
As a further example, suppose you are a member of group 5 and suppose you 
have allocated 11 points to the group account, suppose the other two members 
allocated 0 points in total. In this case the sum of points on the group account is 11, 
and the rank of your group is 5. The conversion factor of your group is 0.80. As a 
consequence your income is: (20 – 11 + 0.5 × 11) × 0.80 = 11.6 points. 
